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DOUGLAS ARANTt
THE Yale Law School experienced a rebirth in the period which began
about 1913 or 1914. In that vital era in its history Arthur L. Corbin played
an especially significant and enduring role; and more than any other individ-
ual perhaps he was a central figure in its development for almost half a cen-
tury. He joined the faculty in 1903 when he was less than thirty years old and
in a few years he established a wide reputation not only as a stimulating and
inspiring teacher but also as a creative legal scholar of great promise. Under
the leadership of Thomas W. Swan, who came as Dean in 1916, Professor
Corbin was an active and influential participant in assembling a remarkable
faculty.
In 1919 Professor Corbin edited a new edition of Anson On Contract.'
This may be regarded as the forerunner of his comprehensive treatise on the
law of contracts. 2 In the "Preface" to that edition he set forth his conception
of the nature of law which he has reiterated and developed in his subsequent
teaching and writing. The student, he said, "should be warned that the law
does not consist of a series of unchangeable rules or principles. . . . Every
system of justice and of right is of human development, and the necessary
corollary is that no known system is eternal. In the long history of the law
can be observed the birth and death of legal principles.... The law is merely
a part of our changing civilization. The history of law is the history of man
and of society. Legal principles represent the prevailing mores of the time, and
with the mores they must necessarily be born, survive for the appointed sea-
son, and perish." 3
He expressed in the same place his conviction of the necessity for accuracy
and clarity of terminology to the end that "fundamental legal conceptions be
described in definite terms without a shifting connotation." He called attention
in that connection to the notable articles on "Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning" published a few years earlier by Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld who came to Yale as professor of law in 1914 and remained
until his death four years later in 1918.4 Those articles unquestionably had
a profound influence upon Professor Corbin's own thinking and writing and
upon his growth and development as a teacher and legal scholar.5 In 1923 lie
gave a remarkable seminar in the Law School on "Legal Analysis and Termi-
t Member, Alabama Bar.
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nology" - an unforgettable intellectual experience for the students who elected
to take it.
In those days most students on taking up the study of law anticipated that
their task would be to commit to memory legal propositions dearly and suc-
cinctly stated in a text - perhaps in bold-face type - and that the principal
problem with which they would be faced in the practice would be to apply
those propositions to varying factual situations as they arose. They thought
the law was definite and certain and they expected the teacher to "lay down"
the law. Soon after they entered upon the study of contracts under Professor
Corbin, however, they learned that the certainty for which they sought did not
and could not exist. He gave them at the outset and reiterated from time to
time in forceful language the substance of the observations later expressed in
the following passage by Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, in his lectures on "The
Nature of the Judicial Process" given at Yale in 1921,6 to which Professor
Corbin referred ten years ago on the occasion of his eightieth birthday: "I vas
much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how trackless
was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was op-
pressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was futile ...
As the years have gone by, and I have reflected more and more upon the
nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty,
because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the
process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts
and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs
of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day
expire, and new principles are born."7
In Professor Corbin's course on contracts, the student was made acquainted
with great books on legal history and with the legal philosophy of great Eng-
lish and American judges and teachers whose opinions and writings were not
taken as the final word but were subjected to study and analysis under his
masterful interrogation and guidance.8 One particularly interesting incident
comes to mind. In 1921 Judge Cardozo, while at Yale to deliver his lectures
on "The Nature of the Judicial Process," visited the class in contracts. On
opening the class Professor Corbin called upon a student to state the case of
DeCicco v. Schweizer,9 a leading case dealing with the doctrine of considera-
tion in which Judge Cardozo had delivered the opinion a few years earlier.
During much of the hour the student was kept on his feet responding to search-
ing questions by Professor Corbin while the opinion was subjected to exhaus-
tive and critical analysis and discussion. Professor Corbin always insisted upon
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the necessity for free and open inquiry with respect to a principle of law re-
gardless of its age or its source, tempered always with innate modesty on his
part and with tolerance and consideration for the views and opinions of others.
William Graham Sumner's Folkways to which he made frequent reference
served as a constant reminder that the law is a part of changing civilization
and that the history of law is the history of man and society.10
This statement in the first paragraph of Holmes' The Common Law be-
came under Professor Corbin's stimulus a vital and enduring element of the
student's attitude toward the law: "The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed."'"
An essential objective in Professor Corbin's teaching was to stimulate and
encourage the student to acquire a background and method of analysis that
would enable him to formulate his own opinions and conclusions and never to
accept any statement of a legal principle without critical analysis. He recog-
nized the need for a philosophy of the law to mediate between the conflicting
claims of stability and progress. He kept the student constantly on guard against
the erroneous notion, often entertained, that the law is a fixed and invariable
system.
It is impossible to think of Professor Corbin other than as a vibrant and
vital force, whether in the classroom or in a tennis match with Professor
William Lyon Phelps or in his active and vigorous life elsewhere. His de-
votion to the study and teaching of law and to the welfare and development
of the Yale Law School as a place for free and open and honest minds has
been wholehearted and complete since his graduation in 1899. No one has
served it so long or with greater wisdom and vitality and to no one does it
owe a greater debt.
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